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Abstract
This article investigates the determinants of insider trading regulation across countries.
The article presents a political economy analysis of such regulation that takes into
account both private (distributional) and public (economic efficiency) considerations.
The model cannot be tested directly because the relevant private preferences and social
costs are unobservable. However, existing theories of capital market development
suggest that various observable social factors can explain the diversity of insider trading
policies across countries. In turn, these social factors should reveal the underlying
preferences and social costs motivating such regulation.
The main finding, based on data from a cross section of countries between 1980 and
1999, is that a country’s political system and not its legal or financial system provides the
first-order explanation of its proclivity to regulate insider trading. Specifically, more
democratic political systems enacted and enforced insider trading laws earlier than less
democratic political systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin,
and measures of latent social factors. In addition, left-leaning governments were relative
latecomers to insider trading legislation and enforcement relative to right-leaning and
centrist governments, controlling for the same factors as above.
The findings are consistent with the political theory of capital market development and
inconsistent with the legal origins theory of capital market development. They also
challenge theoretical claims that insider trading restrictions are market-inhibiting because
the kinds of governments that appear more prone to regulate insider trading are precisely
the governments that are generally thought to pursue market-promoting policies.
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I. Introduction
Insider trading regulation has been controversial at least since Professor Henry
Manne’s theoretical arguments of the 1960s in which he claimed that stock markets were
more efficient when insiders were allowed to freely trade. Although it was not until the
last few years that empirical work challenged the theoretical writing of Manne and
others 1 , it is safe to say that insider trading is regarded by many as a threat to stock
market integrity and efficiency. 2 By 2000, eighty-seven countries had enacted insider
trading legislation and thirty-eight had prosecuted insider trading at least once. 3
However, these laws vary in stringency and many of them were enacted only in recent

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor. Thanks to Michael Barr,
John Coffee, Merritt Fox, Don Herzog, Raphael La Porta, Paul Mahoney, Adam Pritchard, Richard Epstein,
Andrei Shleifer, George Triantis, Detlev Vagts, and especially Richard Lempert. Thanks also to
participants in workshops at the University of Michigan Law School, Columbia Law School, and the
American Law and Association Annual Meeting 2004 for valuable comments and suggestions on various
drafts. I am also grateful to Kindra Baer, Jonathan Ho, Stefania Fusco, Alonzo Lagrone, Jorge Luis Silva
Mendez, Dan Simundza, and Osvaldo Vasquez for excellent research and/or editorial assistance and to
Michigan Law School Cook and Olin Funds for financial support.
1
HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
2
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Regulation, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 67-68
(2002).
3
Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, [ ] (2002);
Gevurtz, supra note [ ], at 65.
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decades, often long after the stock markets came into existence. 4 Enforcement intensity
also varies across countries, with some countries regularly enforcing insider trading laws
and others allowing insiders to trade with impunity notwithstanding the laws on the
books. 5 The question is why. This article seeks to provide at least a partial answer to
this question by explaining the differential timing of insider trading legislation and
enforcement across countries between 1980 and 1999. 6
The answer to this question promises to inform the academic debate about insider
trading regulation, which turns on the question whether such regulation is efficient or
inefficient. There are vocal advocates on both sides of the debate. Those who oppose
insider trading regulation argue that, at best, it simply redistributes rents among private
parties at the cost of regulation 7 and, at worst, reduces market efficiency by distorting
managerial incentives 8 or reducing the accuracy of stock prices. 9 In contrast, proponents
of insider trading regulation argue that such regulation increases market efficiency by

4

See infra Table 3.
See infra Table 3.
6
In this article, I do not attempt to explain why insider trading legislation and enforcement are phenomena
of the late 1980s and 1990s. However, one reason may be that most countries opened up their stock
markets to foreign investors in 1980 or after. In addition, technological advances in recent decades have
increased the level of sophistication of market surveillance, making detection of unusual trading activity
and thus enforcement of insider trading laws more feasible. See generally Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1980) (discussing the problems of enforcing insider
trading laws).
7
See, e.g., David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and America: The
Economics of the Politics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION 149 (J.
Matthias Graf von den Schulenburg & Goran Skogh eds., 1986) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey,
Controlling Insider Trading]; David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private
Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, [ ] (1987)
[hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand]; Carla Tighe and Ron Michener, The Political
Economy of Insider-Trading Laws, 84 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 164-168 (1994) (presenting a
mathematical model supporting Haddock and Macey’s private interest model, id.).
8
See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at [ ].
9
See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 1, at [ ]; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at [ ].
5
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encouraging broader investor participation, increasing liquidity (share trading), and
improving share price accuracy. 10
Legal academics not only disagree about the effect of insider trading regulation on
stock markets, they also disagree about its genesis. Those who oppose such regulation
rely on the private interest theory of regulation to explain how these laws, despite their
inefficiency, are enacted to satisfy influential private interests. 11 In contrast, those who
support insider trading restrictions rely on the public interest theory of regulation to
explain how insider trading regulation is enacted to address market failures. 12 The two
theories are rarely merged into a single framework.
However, because insider trading and its regulation concern the distribution of
property rights to use private corporate information, the issue has both private
(distributional) and public (efficiency) dimensions. Both dimensions are taken into
account in the political economy model in this article. 13 The model has elements of both
private and public interest theories. Like the private interest theory of insider trading
regulation, the analysis can accommodate the enactment of inefficient regulation. 14
10

See e.g., Reinier Kraakman, The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States, in
EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING 39 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1991); Mark Klock, Mainstream
Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Insider Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, [ ] (1994).
11
See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note [ ]; David Haddock & Jonathan Macey, A
Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, [ ] (1987) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey,
Coasian Model].
12
See, e.g., James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the Chicago School,
1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 653 (1986).
13
Many theories of regulation emphasize either an efficiency rationale for regulation or a distributional
rationale for regulation. In the spirit of Professor Becker’s article, see Gary Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983), the model in this
paper incorporates both rationales. This approach to the political economy of insider trading legislation
reflects “the deeper [notion] that the fairness/efficiency debate in insider trading is merely a reprise of the
public/private debate that characterizes many other areas of political and legal discourse. . . . The place of
information along [the] public/private continuum is especially problematic because, unlike most other
valuable objects, information lies particularly close to the imaginary public/private dividing line.” See also
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in
the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV 443, 448 (2001) (parenthetical encouraged).
14
See infra Part II.C.
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However, it can also accommodate the enactment of regulation that enhances social
welfare, even though some private constituencies stand to benefit from such regulation.
It would be ideal to test the model directly using international data. However, that
requires data on the relevant private preferences and social costs across countries. Such
data are frequently unobservable in a single country, let alone internationally. I therefore
shift to a higher level of generality and discuss several observable factors that existing
theory suggests can explain the diversity of insider trading policy across countries. These
factors, which proxy for the underlying preferences and social costs, are financial
development, legal origin, political openness, and ideology. More specifically, the
investor demand model, 15 the legal origins theory of finance, 16 and the political theory of
finance 17 suggest that countries with more developed stock markets, common law legal
systems, and more democratic and right-leaning political systems ought to be more
inclined to regulate insider trading than other countries. Examining whether these factors
correctly predict the enactment and enforcement of insider trading legislation across
countries may reveal something about the underlying preferences and social costs and
thus inform the academic debate about insider trading.
The main finding, based on data I assembled for a cross section of countries
between 1980 and 1999, is that a country’s political system and not its legal or financial
system best explains its proclivity to regulate insider trading. Specifically, more
democratic political systems enacted and enforced insider trading laws earlier than less
democratic political systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin,
and proxies for latent social factors. Furthermore, controlling for the same factors, left15
16

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
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leaning governments were latecomers to insider trading legislation and enforcement
relative to right-leaning and centrist governments.
The findings are consistent with the political theory of capital market
development and inconsistent with the legal origins theory of capital market
development. They also challenge theoretical claims that insider trading restrictions are
market-inhibiting because the kinds of governments that appear more inclined to regulate
insider trading are precisely the governments that are generally thought to pursue marketpromoting policies.
The article is organized as follows. Part II presents a political economy model of
insider trading regulation that integrates both private (distributional) and public
(efficiency) considerations. Part III shifts to a higher level of generality and presents four
empirically testable hypotheses about observable social factors that existing theories
suggest affect translation of the underlying preferences and social costs into the state’s
insider trading policy. I discuss how these factors may explain the differential timing of
enactment and enforcement of insider trading legislation across countries and thus
indirectly reveal the unobservable preferences and social costs that motivate insider
trading regulation. Part IV explains the empirical methodology. Part V describes the
data and presents the results. Finally, Part VI briefly concludes.
II. The Political Economy of Insider Trading
Insider trading legislation concerns the allocation of property rights to use and
benefit from private corporate information. 18 Insider trading laws therefore have an

17

See infra Part III.C.
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING (2007); JONATHAN MACEY, INSIDER
TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider
Trading, Markets, and ‘Negative’ Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, (2001); Kimberly
18
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important influence on the distribution of private rents among corporate insiders and
outsiders. 19 When insider trading is unregulated, by default, the state assigns the
property rights to private corporate information to corporate insiders, enabling them to
maximize their private rents from the use of such information. In contrast, when insider
trading is prohibited, the state removes insiders’ monopoly on the use of private corporate
information and thus redistributes private rents to outsiders. 20 The preferences and
relative political influence of insiders and outsiders are important determinants of the
state’s insider trading policy. However, insider trading regulation does not just affect the
distribution of private rents. It also affects capital market efficiency and thus overall
economic efficiency. In this Part, I present a political economy analysis of insider trading
regulation that integrates both distributional and economic efficiency concerns.
A. The Private Constituencies: Who Gains and Who Loses from Insider Trading?
Insider trading creates winners and losers. 21 In this section, I consider the likely
winners and losers.
1. The Potential Winners: Corporate Insiders
Corporate insiders include managers, board members, and controlling or large
shareholders. Their status gives them privileged access to corporate information and thus
a probable trading advantage relative to outsiders. They can earn significant profits from
insider trading. Evidence suggests that insiders make superior profits relative to public

Kraweic, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443 (2001).
19
Id.
20
Effective insider trading laws reduce insiders’ ability to use private corporate information to their
exclusive benefit.
21
Some argue that insider trading produces no net gainers or losers. See, e.g., William J. Carney,
Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, [ ] (1987). This argument is not
convincing because, if it was true, insider trading would not be such a controversial political issue. See,
e.g., Gevurtz, supra note [ ], at 65.
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investors and other participants in the stock market even when they trade on the basis of
publicly available and thus immaterial 22 information. 23 Insider trading on the basis of
material, non-public information is probably even more profitable, especially in stock
markets where there are relatively few constraints on self-dealing by insiders. 24
Professor Arturo Bris, for example, presents international evidence that suggests insider
trading on the basis of private information about corporate takeovers is very profitable
and insider trading profits vary inversely with the stringency of insider trading laws. 25
Some “Chicago” or neoclassical theories of insider trading dismiss the notion that
insider trading benefits corporate insiders over and above standard compensation. 26 They
argue that insiders do not gain on net, because their salaries are reduced commensurate
with their trading profits. 27 The argument is not convincing because, by definition,
insider trading is not transparent. Furthermore, no evidence has been presented to show
that those who have been found to have violated insider trading laws were receiving
lower salaries or other forms of compensation, at the time of transgression, than similarly

22

Immaterial information is generally information that, if publicly known, would not impact the stock’s
price. In contrast, material information would, if publicly known, affect the stock’s price. See, e.g., Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, [ ] (1988).
23
See, e.g., Leslie Jeng et. al., Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation
Perspective, in REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 453 (2003) (applying performance-evaluation
techniques to reported U.S. insider transactions over 1975-1996 and finding that a constructed portfolio of
insiders’ purchases earns abnormal returns of approximately 40 basis points per month); Nejat Seyhun, The
Effectiveness of Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1992) (finding that insiders outperform
the market in buying and selling their firm’s shares on the basis of public information).
24
Such constraints may be legal, political, moral, social or institutional.
25
Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work? 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT 267, [ ] (2005). Bris uses Beny’s
index of the insider trading law stringency. Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? 7
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144 (2005) [hereinafter Beny, Do Laws Matter?].
26
See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at [ ] (arguing that insiders’ compensation will be reduced
dollar for dollar with any profits they make from insider trading).
27
I.d.
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situated non-violators. 28 Indeed, even in the absence of a legal prohibition, insiders have
strong incentives to disguise their trading activity. 29
A related argument is that insider trading profits are not a windfall gain but
simply compensate employees for the entrepreneurial services they provide to the firm. 30
Absent such compensation, the argument goes, employees would have insufficient
incentives to innovate. 31 This argument assumes that insider trading profits are
observable, an assumption that has yet to be empirically supported. It also assumes that
non-innovating employees would refrain from insider trading.
A final argument is that insiders do not gain from insider trading because they pay
for insider trading in the form of a higher cost of capital because investors discount share
prices to reflect the probability of insider trading. 32 This too is a theoretical rather than
empirical proposition and depends on assumptions about information availability that are
unlikely to be true. Moreover, even if the argument were true on balance, outsiders may
underestimate the probability of insider trading in some instances and overestimate it in
others. Insiders would be overcompensated in the former case and under-compensated in
the latter. In both cases, compensation would be inefficient. As Professors Bebchuk and

28

However, Roulstone finds evidence of a substitution effect between legal insider trading and total
compensation: “firms that restrict when insiders can trade pay a 4% to 13% premium in total compensation
relatives to firms that do not restrict insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of
compensation.” Darren Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive
Compensation, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 525, 526 (2003).
29
See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note [ ], at 50 (arguing that “insiders would prefer to trade anonymously to
preserve their informational monopolies, even if their activities were legal”). One solution to this problem
is to require insiders to disclose their trades, as does Section 16(b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16(b) (2006).
30
See MANNE, supra note 1, at [ ].
31
Id.
32
See Michael Manove, The Harm in Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, 104 Q. J. ECON. 823
(1989) (presenting a formal model of the insider trading discount).
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Jolls suggest, insider trading may yield a private benefit with costs that are not entirely
borne by insiders but shared with outsiders who do not benefit. 33
Tippees (relatives, friends, business and political associates of corporate insiders)
also gain when they trade on the basis of private information received from insiders, and
no intra-firm dynamics will compensate for their benefits. 34 In some countries, much
insider trading is done by politicians and government bureaucrats who receive private
information in exchange for economic or political favors. 35 Tippees’ insider trading
profits are a windfall gain since, unlike managers and other primary insiders, they are
unlikely to increase firm value through entrepreneurial or productive services. The fact
that insiders who theoretically may see some of their gains lost to stock price or internal
compensation adjustments tip outsiders is good evidence that they perceive insider
trading as a way to extract rents from inside information. 36
2. The Potential Losers: Information, Liquidity Traders, and Small
Investors
Outsiders who stand to lose from insider trading include information traders,
liquidity traders and possibly small (i.e., minority) outside investors.
Information traders receive most of their income from stock trading and are
insiders’ main competitors for trading profits. These market participants include market
professionals, like analysts, broker-dealers, market makers, and other sophisticated

33

Lucian Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 487, [ ] (1999). How much of the burden is passed on to outsiders depends on how accurately they
are able to discount share prices to reflect value diversion from insider trading.
34
Outsiders who receive private information from insiders are often called “tippees.” See, e.g., Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, [ ] (1980).
35
In India, for example, “the broker-promoter--politician-fund manager nexus . . . these days accounts for
the biggest chunk of insider trading.” Sucheta Dalal, Nabbing Insider Traders: Easier Said Than Done,
REDIFF, Aug. 16, 2000, http://www.rediff.com/money/2000/aug/16dalal.htm.
36
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, [ ] (1983); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, [ ] (1979).
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investors. While their knowledge or ability to process corporate information is superior
to those of other outside investors, they experience direct losses from insider trading.
Informed traders consistently lose relative to insiders when the latter trade on the basis of
material, non-public information because, although they are well informed relative to
outsiders, informed traders are at a distinct informational disadvantage vis-à-vis
insiders. 37
Liquidity traders are investors who trade frequently and thus benefit from low
trading costs. They include institutional investors, like pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies, and index traders. Their trading is largely driven by exogenous
factors like portfolio realignment or short-term consumption rather than by new
information. Theoretical 38 and empirical 39 studies suggest that insider trading increases
transaction costs. Thus, liquidity traders stand to lose from insider trading because they
trade frequently enough to be harmed by greater transaction costs.
It is less clear how insider trading affects uninformed, small outside shareholders
who trade infrequently and own minority equity stakes in firms. They may be indirectly
harmed if greater mutual and pension fund fees are passed on to them by institutional
investors who experience increased trading costs as a result of insider trading. In
addition, if insider trading raises agency costs (i.e., causes managers to behave in ways
37

See Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure
Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993); Goshen &
Parchomovsky, supra note [ ]; Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note [ ]; Jhinyoung Shin,
The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 49 (1996). In other work, I find a
positive relationship between the stringency of insider trading laws and stock price informativeness,
indirectly suggesting that information traders are discouraged by insider trading because stock prices are
more informative when informed trading activity is vibrant. Beny, Do Laws Matter?, supra note [ ], at [ ].
38
See, e.g., Lawrence Glosten & Lawrence Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J.
FIN. ECON. 123 (1988); Shin, supra note [ ].
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that reduce corporate value) and the market systematically underestimates the amount of
such trading, small outside investors will be harmed by it because they will be buying
shares at a higher price than their actual value. In contrast, if insider trading reduces
agency costs and the market underestimates the amount of such trading, minority
shareholders will benefit from it because they will be buying shares at a lower price than
their actual value. 40 While the jury is still out, recent evidence suggests that some outside
shareholders value insider trading restrictions. 41
B. Social Costs: Economic Efficiency Considerations
Apart from its private distributional effects, theory and evidence suggest several
ways in which insider trading may be economically inefficient for stock markets and the
economy as a whole. 42
1. Price Informativeness and Capital Allocation
Information traders play a positive role in price formation, both in the extent and
kind of information that is impounded in stock prices.43 They are rewarded for this by
the profits they earn in trading against less informed investors. They maximize their
profits by gathering firm-specific information until the marginal cost exceeds the
marginal benefit of gathering such information. The collective trading of many such

39

See, e.g., Thomas Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects and the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457
(1983); Glosten & Harris, supra note [ ]; Hans Stoll, Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread:
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 44 J. FIN. 115 (1989).
40
In another article, I address the agency implications of insider trading and its regulation. Laura N. Beny,
Do Investors in Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence, J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript, on file with author).
41
See id.; Art Durnev & Amrita Nain, Does Insider Trading Regulation Deter Private Information
Trading? International Evidence, PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. (forthcoming 2007).
42
There is some theoretical work, e.g., MANNE, supra note 1, at [ ]; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at [ ],
arguing that insider trading is socially beneficial, but I am not aware of any empirical support for this
claim.
43
Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note [ ], at [ ]; Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock
Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Price Movements? 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215, [ ]
(2000).
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traders leads to more efficient capitalization of firm-specific information into stock
prices, 44 making stock prices more informative. 45
Professor Jeffrey Wurgler shows that capital is more efficiently allocated in the
economy when a greater amount of firm-specific information is capitalized into stock
prices. 46 It thus follows that if insider trading discourages information traders, it imposes
a negative externality on the economy by reducing the informativeness of stock prices, 47
even if not all traders are discouraged. Consistent with this, in other work I document a
positive relationship between stock price informativeness and the stringency of insider
trading laws. 48 Thus, capital allocation may be less efficient in countries with lax insider
trading legislation and enforcement.
2. Capital Constraints and the Cost of Capital
Capital constraints limit the range of feasible investments in the economy, in turn
limiting economic growth. 49 A lower cost of capital makes investments more profitable
and encourages the entry of new entrepreneurs into the capital market. Using
international time series data, Professors Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk
demonstrate that the initial enforcement of insider trading legislation is followed by a 5%

44

Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse
Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35
(1997).
45
Kenneth French & Richard Roll, Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction
of Traders, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1986); Richard Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541 (1988).
46
Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000).
47
Morck et al., supra note [ ], at [ ] present cross-country evidence that stock price infomativeness and
investor protections are positively correlated, implying that beneficial arbitrage activity is greater in
countries where the threat of expropriation is lower.
48
Beny, Do Laws Matter?, supra note [ ], at [ ]; see also Nuno Fernandes & Miguel A. Ferreira, Insider
Trading Laws and Stock Price Informativeness (ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, Working Paper
No. 161/2007, 2007) (using international data, finds that enforcement of insider trading laws improves
stock price informativeness).
49
Geert Bekaert & Campbell Harvey, Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets, 55 J. FIN. 565,[ ]
(2000).
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decrease in the cost of capital. 50 Their finding suggests that capital is more expensive in
countries where the public perceives insider trading to be unregulated. This implies that
enforcing insider trading legislation could ultimately lead to greater economic growth by
reducing the cost of capital.
3. Transaction Costs and Liquidity
Liquid markets are socially valuable because greater liquidity makes purchasing
and disposing of shares on short notice at the appropriate price easier for investors. The
more liquid the market, the more willing investors should be to participate in it.
Professors Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson confirm that investors value liquidity by
showing that companies whose shares are more liquid must pay investors a lower
expected rate of return than companies with less liquid shares. 51 In other words, their
evidence shows that companies with more liquid shares have a lower cost of equity
capital. Liquid markets may also mitigate agency costs, by lowering the opportunity cost
of monitoring and facilitating the market for corporate control. 52 As noted above,
however, evidence suggests that insider trading increases transaction costs and thus
reduces stock market liquidity.
In short, there are several potential channels through which insider trading may
reduce both stock market efficiency and overall economic efficiency.

50

Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ]. However, Geert Bekaert et at., Does Financial
Liberalization Spur Growth?, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 3, [ ] (2005) show that the positive effect of enforcing
insider trading laws on the cost of capital is not robust to controlling for stock market liberalization (i.e., a
country’s opening its stock market to foreign investors).
51
Yakov Amiuhud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. ECON. 223
(1986).
52
Markus Berndt, Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems, in KONOMISCHE ANALYSE DES
RECHTS [Economic Analysis of Law] 3 (Peter Behrens et al. eds., 2002); Ernst Maug, Insider Trading
Legislation and Corporate Governance, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1569, [ ] (2002). But see Amar Bhide, The
Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1993) (arguing that greater liquidity hinders
corporate monitoring).
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C. A Political Economy Model of Insider Trading Regulation
According to the public interest theory of regulation, governments intervene in
markets to correct their failures and thus promote efficiency. 53 From this perspective,
insider trading regulation can be seen as an attempt by the government to address a
market failure that market participants are unwilling or unable to solve through private
contracting. 54 A fundamental weakness of the public interest theory of regulation,
however, is that it is vague about the mechanisms through which a social desire to correct
a market failure gets translated into public policy. 55 Thus, for example, the mere fact that
insider trading may be thought to be inefficient does not lead to the automatic enactment
of insider trading legislation. Market inefficiencies can persist for long periods without
governmental intervention, due not just to the costs of regulation but also to effective
opposition to reform from private parties who stand to lose from insider trading
regulation. The private interest theory of regulation is also deficient in that it tends to
consider competition between special interest groups as the sole determinant of who wins
the regulatory game. 56 Theorists of this stripe generally view regulatory intervention as

53

Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (reviewing
theories of regulation, including public interest theory).
54
See, e.g., Cox, supra note [ ], at 653; see also Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement of
Securities Laws: Preliminary Evidence (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (comparing
public and private enforcement of securities laws).
55
Posner, supra note [ ], at [ ]; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, THE GRABBING HAND:
GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 10 (1998) (“[I]nstitutions supporting property rights are
created not by the fiat of a public-spirited government but, rather, in response to political pressure on the
government exerted by owners of private property.”). But see Steven P. Croley, Public Interested
Regulation, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, [ ] (2000) (parenthetical encouraged).
56
E.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, [ ] (1976);
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). David
Haddock and Jonathan Macey apply this type of model to insider trading regulation, and argue that insider
trading legislation is the result of demand from powerful special interests. Haddock & Macey, Regulation
on Demand, supra note [ ], at [ ].
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inefficient, seemingly overlooking the empirical reality that regulation sometimes does
enhance economic efficiency. 57
As Professor Gary Becker recognizes, the impetus for policy change lies
somewhere between public and private interest theories of regulation. 58 Becker
integrates the two approaches in a model of interest-group competition. 59 In his model,
consistent with the private interest theory of regulation, interest groups support policies
that maximize their private rents. Those with the most at stake do not automatically
prevail, however. Who prevails among private constituencies depends on several factors
that influence the relative efficiency of their political expenditures, such as group wealth,
social and political networks, and size. 60 It also depends on the social welfare
implications of the competing preferences. This is the novel aspect of Becker’s model:
social welfare plays an explicit role in the outcome of competition among private parties.
Specifically, efficiency enters the model in that an interest group has an inherent

57

Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Coase versus the Coasians, 116 QUARTERLY
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 853 (2001) aptly note how the Coasians are more Coasian than Coase was
himself. They also show how securities laws can increase economic efficiency. See also Simeon Djankov,
Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silances & Andrei Shleifer, The New Comparative
Economics, 31 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS 595-619, 607, 612-613 (2003) (“not all institutional
failure should be blamed on politics. In fact, politics often moves societies toward institutional efficiency
rather than away from it…..even when some interest groups obstruct change, Coasian bargaining often
leads to efficient institutional choice” and citing U.S. progressive reforms as example of efficiencyincreasing regulation); Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000)
(arguing that regulation may sometimes be in the public interest, i.e., increase economic efficiency); SUSAN
M. PHILLIPS AND J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 25 (1981) (leaning toward
public choice (private interest) theory of regulation but acknowledging that public choice and efficiency
might in some cases merge: “Even if all the SEC regulatory programs were to conform to the public choice
model, for example, it is still interesting to ask whether a particular program such as corporate disclosure is
in the public interest in the sense that it advances economic efficiency”).
58
Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ]; see also Croley, supra note [ ], at [ ] (parenthetical suggested).
59
Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ].
60
Smaller, more cohesive groups are often thought to be more influential than larger groups because they
are better able to control free-riding among their members. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (parenthetical strongly encouraged). However, having a smaller size need not
always give a group a political advantage. Professor Becker’s model illustrates that more members may
increase the effective influence of special interest groups, if the scale effect outweighs the free riding effect
of an increase in group size. Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ].
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advantage in the competition if its preferred policy raises social welfare and an inherent
disadvantage in the competition if its preferred policy lowers social welfare. 61
Becker’s framework can be applied to the contest over insider trading
regulation. 62 The status quo ante is unregulated insider trading. Corporate outsiders –
information and liquidity traders and small outside investors – who may seek to overturn
the status quo must prevail upon the state to enact and enforce insider trading legislation.
Insiders will resist insider trading regulation through various means, including monetary
payments to politicians and, importantly, information tip-offs to politicians and market
professionals. If insiders are able to co-opt market professionals, who include
information and liquidity traders, they may easily succeed in maintaining the status quo
because in many stock markets small outside investors are a relatively unorganized group
whose relatively small individual stakes provide little financial incentive to lobby. 63
Thus, on the face of it, it seems as though corporate insiders could often easily defeat
insider trading regulation.
However, applying Becker’s integrated public-private framework, insider
prevalence cannot be taken for granted. If insider trading is inefficient, as it may be in
some markets, insiders will be inherently disadvantaged in the competition over

61

A group that favors an inefficient policy may overcome its inherent disadvantage if it is able to exert
greater political influence than the competing group.
62
In the Appendix, I present a formal, albeit highly stylized model of competition between insiders and
outsiders for influence over a government regulator who sets insider trading policy. The model assumes
that insiders prefer to trade with impunity while outsiders prefer a ban on insider trading. As in Professor
Becker’s model, an interest group has an inherent advantage if the policy that it favors raises social welfare
and an inherent disadvantage if its preferred policy is socially inefficient. It is not necessary to read the
model to follow the rest of the article.
63
However, normative factors, like a sense of what is fair, may cause small investors to have strong
feelings about the matter. Furthermore, as the investor class in a country expands, outside investors may
become more organized and begin to lobby based on their collective financial interests. See infra Part
III.A.
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regulatory policy relative to outsiders. While they may be able to overcome this
disadvantage in some social contexts, they may not be able to do so in others.
III. Testable Hypotheses
While it would be ideal to test the political economy model in Part II directly,
direct data on the relevant private preferences and social costs are unavailable across
countries. Thus, in this Part, I switch to a greater level of generality and focus on three
observable factors – financial development, law, and politics. Existing theories suggest
that these factors can explain the diversity of insider trading policy across countries. In
the process they may reveal something about the preferences and social costs underlying
such policy. 64 In this Part, I discuss these theories and present four testable hypotheses.
A. Finance: The “Investor Demand” Model 65
As the stock market develops, outside investors may become more effective at
exerting political pressure on the state to adopt greater investor protections, including
insider trading regulation. 66 There are several channels through which this may occur.
First, as the size of the domestic investor class increases, their wealth and influence
becomes more important relative to those of insiders. Outside investor’s influence may
increase even more relative to insiders’ if their numbers consist of foreign investors, who
reside or invest primarily in countries where restrictions on insider trading are the

64

See Figure 1 for a model of causality from preferences to insider trading policy.
See generally PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL 96123 (2005) (“In the investor model, the owners of firms and external providers of capital work out a ‘good
governance’ bargain through a combination of private ordering and public regulations, thus providing
protections for minority shareholders.”).
66
See, e.g.,Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development, and
Politics, 4 JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 315-341 (2006) (presenting a model with
mutual feedback between stock market development and investor protection, where greater investor
protection leads to a broader stock market, which in turn broadens the shareholder base and increases
political support for shareholder protections).
65
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norm. 67 Second, as stock markets develop, institutions may emerge to mitigate the freeriding problems that stymie collective action by small outside investors. 68 Investor
associations are an important example. In the United States, for example, the Investor’s
Clearinghouse is an online forum run by the Alliance for Investor Education. 69 The
website disseminates information to dispersed investors on a wide variety of topics of
concern, such as the determinants of mutual fund fees.
As the stock market develops, market professionals may also become more
cohesive and display interests distinct from those of corporate insiders. Institutional
investors, for example, may begin to share information on issues of collective concern,
like corporate governance and securities fraud. One U.S. example is Institutional
Investor Online. 70 The site provides articles about a range of issues of concern to
institutional investors, like the dangers of investing in overseas markets, like China, that
are rife with insider trading and market manipulation. 71 The international edition of the
Institutional Investor Online, 72 monitors corporate performance in many countries,
including emerging markets, like Brazil and India, and often ranks companies based on

67

Professors Bakaert, Harvey and Lundblad argue that “[i]t is possible that the enactment of [insider
trading] rules are particularly valued and perhaps demanded by foreigners before they take the risk of
investing in emerging markets.” Bekaert et at., supra note [ ], at 27. The internationalization of stock
markets has led to a proliferation of regulatory harmonization efforts among countries (e.g., through the
auspices of institutions like the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and
bilateral agreements between the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and foreign market
regulators). Arguably, this has generated a “race-to-the-top” in the sense that many countries have agreed
to amend their laws in order to satisfy minimum standards of securities regulation.
68
In the theoretical model in Appendix, mechanisms that reduce free riding problems are considered to
increase the “productivity” of political expenditures. See also Becker, supra note [ ], at [ ] (parenthetical
encouraged).
69
The Investor’s Clearinghouse, http://www.investoreducation.org/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
70
Institutional Investor, http://www.iimagazine.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
71
See, e.g., Kevin Hamilton, Laissez Regulators, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 25, 2002, http://www.
iimagazine.com/article.aspx?articleID=1036391.
72
Institutional Investor International Edition, http://www.iimagazine.com/default.aspx?theme=International
(last visited January 21, 2008).
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their corporate governance practices. 73 Finally, an innovative U.S. example is the
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse jointly run by Stanford Law School and
Cornerstone Research, a private consulting firm. 74 The clearinghouse, in operation since
1996, provides individual and institutional investors with unprecedented access to class
action securities fraud litigation documents that would otherwise be private.
Stock exchanges, seeking to maximize trading volume and thus commissions,
may begin to engage in self-regulation long before formal legislative action is taken. 75
This occurred in the U.S. and the United Kingdom as their stock markets were
developing. Private stock exchanges in the two countries regulated their members, which
include stock-issuing firms and market professionals like brokers-dealers, imposing
listing requirements and disclosure and anti-manipulation rules. 76 In turn, self-regulation
by market professionals may stimulate legislative action that leads to formal stock market
regulation. As Professor Coffee observes, private parties may eventually perceive selfregulation to be insufficient because of enforcement deficiencies:
[e]ven when a strong private institutional structure exists (as it did in the case of
the NYSE), there are still important deficiencies which require legislative
intervention in order to provide adequate enforcement. …the enforcement
shortfall that is inherent in a self-regulatory system [is due to] several different
73

See, e.g., “Institutional Investor Releases Inaugural Ranking of Asia’s Top Executives and ShareholderFriendly Companies,” INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, http://www.iimagazine.com/RankingsAsiaTopExec.aspx
(last visited January 21, 2008) (releasing a survey of investors and portfolio managers that “ranks the top
executives and companies in Asia, showing which are most effective in satisfying investors with straight
talk, open and honest reporting and top-notch investor relations”).
74
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu/ (last visited January 21, 2008).
75
John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of
Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, [ ] (2001). According to Professor Coffee, “[b]y a variety of
means, including a substantial self-regulatory component, both the United States and the United Kingdom
developed legal and institutional mechanisms that enabled dispersed ownership to persist. Generally, these
mechanisms followed, rather than preceded, economic changes, but they did protect and facilitate the
growth of dispersed ownership.” Id. at [ ]; see also Brian Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of
Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, [ ] (2001) (parenthetical
encouraged)
76
See Coffee, supra note [ ], at [ ] (“By the 1950s, the [London Stock Exchange’s] listing rules had been
tightened to require issuers to reveal all material information on an ongoing basis.”).
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reasons: (1) A private body has weak incentives to enforce rules against its own
members and clients; (2) Enforcement is too costly for a private body to
undertake on a thorough-going basis; and (3) Private bodies necessarily lack the
investigative tools and punitive sanctions that the State has at its disposal. 77

Thus, as the stock market increases in significance, constituencies that favor liquidity and
an orderly market may increase private demand for regulatory oversight that is likely to
include insider trading legislation and enforcement. Furthermore, as these constituencies
become more organized and resource-endowed they should pose a greater political threat
to the insider-dominated status quo.
The social cost of insider trading may also increase and thus strengthen the
efficiency case for insider trading legislation as the stock market develops. Insider
trading becomes more profitable and thus more tempting as stock markets become more
liquid and efficient. 78 Because equity finance is more important to the economy, this
raises the potential social cost of insider trading. Applying the model developed in Part
II, this implies an increase in outside investors’ relative advantage (or a decrease in their
relative disadvantage) in the political competition over insider trading policy.
In summary, as the stock market develops, both private and public forces are
likely to bring insider trading policy to the forefront of legislative debate and increase
outsiders’ ability to challenge the insider-dominated status quo. 79 These observations
lead to the first prediction:

Hypothesis 1
77

Id. at [ ].
Bris, supra note [ ], at [ ]; Maug, supra note [ ], at [ ].
79
See Coffee, supra note [ ], at [ ] (“Legislative action is thus likely to follow, rather than precede, the
appearance of securities markets because a constituency of public investors must first arise before there will
be pressure for legislative reform that intrudes upon the market.”).
78
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A country with a more developed stock market is more likely to enact and enforce insider
trading legislation than a country with a less developed stock market.

However, the country’s legal and political systems will constrain outsiders’ ability to
overcome the status quo. These potential constraints are addressed in the next two
sections.
B. Legal Origins
Although it is coming under increasing intellectual scrutiny and empirical
challenge, legal origins theory is an influential movement. 80 The central claim of the
theory is that the main predictor of financial development is a country’s legal origin.
Fundamental differences between common law and civil law systems, so the theory
posits, yield fundamental differences in investor protection laws, which then produce
different levels of financial development.
More specifically, the legal origins theory of finance claims that “common law
countries protect [outside] shareholders better than do civil law countries.” 81 Thus, small
investors are more willing to invest in common law countries than in civil law countries,
where they fear being robbed by insiders and large shareholders. The result is that
common law countries develop deep stock markets with diffuse ownership, while stock
markets in civil law countries remain shallow and firms must rely on traditional forms of

80

See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, [ ] (1998) [hereinafter La
Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131, [ ] (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants]. For critiques of the legal origins
approach, see GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 85-87; Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in
Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, [ ] (2000); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and
Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 462, 470-82 (2006) [hereinafter Roe, Legal Origins].
81
Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at [ ] n.13 (citing Simeon Djankov et al., supra note [ ]). The
mechanisms that are believed to drive the legal and financial differences between common law and civil
law countries are the existence of fiduciary duties in common law systems and their absence in civil law
systems, the supposedly greater flexibility of common law judges compared to civil law judges, and the
“over-regulation” of markets in civil law countries. Id. at 471-474.
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finance, like banks, related firms, and founding families. 82 Stock ownership and control
thus tends to be highly concentrated in civil law countries, according to the legal family
theory. 83
In turn, these divergent markets structures foster different power relations
between insiders and outsiders in the two legal systems. Outside investors, according to
the theory, have greater power relative to corporate insiders in common law countries
than they do in civil law countries. 84 The theory implies that in civil law countries
corporate insiders and dominant shareholders are likely to pose a formidable obstacle to
outsiders seeking the enactment and enforcement of insider trading legislation. 85 That is
the private interest side of the equation.
On the public side, the theory suggests that there will be a greater efficiency
imperative for insider trading regulation and enforcement in common law countries than
in civil law countries. As noted in the preceding section, as the stock market develops
and equity finance becomes more important to the national economy, the public interest
case for insider trading regulation is likely to increase. Legal origin theory suggests that
common law countries will be more responsive to this need because an important premise

82

La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ], at [ ]; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ],
at [ ].
83
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ], at [ ]; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ],
at [ ]. But see Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 495-501 (2006); Sonja Fagernäs, Prabirjit Sarkar & Ajit
Singh, Legal Origin, Shareholder Protection and the Stock Market: New Challenges from Time Series
Analysis, CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE WORKING PAPER NO. 343 (2007)
(casting doubt on the claim that common law countries have stronger shareholder protection, which leads to
greater stock market development, using data on sixty annual legal indicators for the period 1970-2005 for
France, Germany, the UK and the US).
84
Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the
Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, [ ] (2003); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection: Origins,
Consequences, Reform (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7428, 1999).
85
See Maug, supra note [ ], at [ ], demonstrating that controlling shareholders benefit when insider trading
laws are lax. In a similar vein, Harold Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trading and Rates of Return,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 313, [ ] (1986) and Bhide, supra note [ ], at [ ], argue that insider trading legislation
reduces controlling shareholders’ profits.
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of the theory is that common law systems are more adaptive to “the changing needs of
society”. 86 The common law is thought to be more accommodating of modernization
because common law judges have greater flexibility than civil law judges. Common law
is also said to be more market-promoting than civil law. 87
In summary, legal origins theory suggests that common law countries are more
likely to enact and enforce insider trading legislation in response to private and public
demand than civil law countries. 88 This is the second prediction:
Hypothesis 2
A common law country is more likely to enact and enforce insider trading legislation than
a civil law country with the same level of stock market development.

C. Politics
The political theory of finance emphasizes the centrality of politics to stock
market development. 89 According to the theory, state policy toward the stock market is
86

This is the dynamic “law and finance theory”:
The common law is inherently dynamic as it responds case-by-case to the changing needs
of society. This tends to limit the opportunities for large gaps to grow between the
demands of society and the law. Since laws must evolve efficiently to support financial
development, the dynamic law and finance view predicts that common law is particularly
effective in supporting financial institutions. Moreover, the inherently dynamic nature of
the common law implies that countries that received the common law have received a
legal tradition that will more naturally adapt to different socioceconomic conditions and
more readily evolve with changing commercial requirements than countries with the
French civil law.

Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, & Ross Levine, Law, Politics, and Finance 17 (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author). See also Coffee, supra note [ ], at [ ]. (“[T]he more decentralized
character of common law legal institutions [perhaps] facilitated the rise of both private and semi-private
self-regulatory bodies in the U.S. and the U.K., whereas in civil law systems the state retained a relative
monopoly over law-making institutions.”).
87
See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right, 30 J. Legal
Stud. 503, [ ] (2001) (arguing that civil law countries poorly protect property rights, thus stifling economic
growth).
88
But see Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 472 (noting that insider trading was legal in most U.S.
states at common law).
89
E.g., Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 1005, 1027 (2005); Rajan & Zingales, supra note [ ]; Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ]; Mark Roe,
Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000)
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jointly determined by competing preferences, the distribution of power, the national rules
of the political game and ideology. 90 I focus on the last two factors in this section.
Regarding the first, Professors Gourevitch and Shinn write: “[t]o obtain the most
advantageous rules each player needs a way of getting the political system to reflect its
preferences.” 91 Regarding the second, Professor Roe states bluntly: “[t]he first order
condition is a polity that supports capital markets.” 92
The political theory of finance suggests that outsiders are more likely to get the
political system to reflect their preferences in democracies than in authoritarian states.
Outsiders should have significantly greater difficulty in challenging the status quo
(unregulated insider trading, or an as yet non-enforced insider trading ban) in countries
with relatively closed and undemocratic political systems because insiders, the
incumbents, have more sway with the state in such systems. 93
Weak democracies have formalized elections and means of leadership
succession, but are quite vulnerable to manipulation by elites and special
interest groups. Money, guns, poverty, weak civil service systems, and
ignorance can all contribute to a system unable to enforce its rules and
regulations…. In a corrupt democracy, investors feel insecure, and [outside
stock ownership] will not take place. 94
[hereinafter Roe, Political Preconditions]; Mark Roe, Rents and their Corporate Law Consequences, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2001); Lucian Bebhcuk & Zvika Neeman, Corporate Governance and Interest Group
Politics (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, supra note
[ ].
90
See e.g., GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 58 (“Policy . . . is the output of preferences and power
resources mediated by political institutions.”).
91
Id. at 57.
92
Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 464.
93
According to Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 222, [ ] (1999)
[hereinafter La Porta, Quality of Government], “[g]overnments become massively redistributive when there
are relatively few very powerful groups with different interests, not when there are many relatively weak
groups each pushing in its own direction.” See also Mara Faccio, Ronald Masulis, & John McConnel,
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. FIN. 2597 (2006) (finding that governments are
significantly more likely to bail out politically connected firms than non-connected firms, using data from
thirty-five countries between 1997 and 2000); Mara Faccio & David Parsley, Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock
of Political Connections (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding a significant positive
association between firms’ political connections and their values).
94
GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 81; see also Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase
Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS 620-652
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In contrast, when the political process is open and contestable, outsiders have a greater
chance of influencing national policy. 95
The political theory of finance also suggests that outsiders are more likely to get
the political system to reflect their preferences under right-leaning and centrist
governments than under left-leaning governments. In his labor model of politics and
finance, Professor Roe poses the pivotal questions: “Who has power? Do they like
capital markets, do they dislike them, or are they indifferent to them?” 96 In the model,
left-leaning governments tend to eschew investors and capital market regulation and
focus on workers and labor market regulation. Such neglect of capital markets does not
necessarily stem from hostility toward capital owners, although it may. 97 The important

(2003) (presenting a theoretical analysis that suggest that policies will be less inefficient, the greater are the
checks and balances on the ruling elite).
95
See Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Entry: Lobbying and Financial
Development (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“investor protection improve[s] when
the…political system becomes more accountable”); Bebchuk & Neeman, supra note [ ], at 26-27 (showing
that investor protection improves when politicians are less susceptible to special interest lobbying). The
U.S is a good example. The U.S. political process is sufficiently open to enable outsiders to mount
successful challenges (e.g., the insider trading prohibition or the recent Sarbanes Oxley Act) against
corporate constituencies (insiders) with some frequency. Administrative procedures also encourage
outsiders to participate in rulemaking. For example, the U.S. SEC posts proposed rules on its website, and
solicits comments from interested parties; the publication of proposed rules and solicitation of public
comments creates a forum for discussion among interested groups and plays an important role in the
translation of market participants’ interests into regulatory policy. U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, How to Submit Comments on SEC Rulemaking, http://www.sec.gov/rules/
submitcomments.htm (last visited Jan 25, 2008).
96
Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 511 fig.6.
97
Roe notes that “[i]n social democracies – nations…whose governments play a large role in the
economy, emphasize distributional considerations, and favor employees over capital-owners when
the two conflict – public policy emphasizes managers’ natural agenda and demeans shareholders’
natural agenda.” Roe, Political Preconditions, supra note [ ], at 3–4. Professor Roe maintains
that social democracies “do not want unbridled shareholder wealth maximization, and, hence
[emasculate] shareholder wealth maximization institutions.” Id. at 4. Professor Coffee disagrees,
arguing that a more “feasible political explanation is . . . that power seeking nationalists could use
banks as their agents and that banks, once entrenched, had natural reason to resist the rise of rivals
for their business.” Coffee, supra note [ ], at 53. La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supra
note [ ], at [ ], also emphasize the role of state intervention in financial markets, arguing that for
historical and cultural reasons Europeans support greater State intervention than Americans.
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point is that left-oriented states and legislatures tend to devote their political energy and
resources to labor-protective redistributive policies. 98
Roe’s labor model suggests that left-leaning governments are less likely to
redistribute property rights in inside information from the corporate elite (managers and
dominant shareholders) and their associates to outside investors than right-leaning or
centrist governments. In fact, keeping corporate information inside the firm may be an
explicit outcome of the state’s political bargain with corporate insiders in a left-leaning,
pro-labor regime. 99
The observations in this section yield the article’s final predictions:
Hypothesis 3a
A country with a more democratic political system is more likely to enact and enforce
insider trading legislation than a country with a less democratic political system with the
same level of stock market development.
Hypothesis 3b
A country with a left-leaning government is more likely to enact and enforce insider
trading legislation than a country with a right-leaning government and the same level of
stock market development.
Hypotheses 1-3 are summarized in Table 1.
IV. Methodology – Duration Analysis
The regression analysis covers countries that had not enacted or enforced insider
trading legislation as of 1980. I first examine the enactment of insider trading legislation.
98

Roe supports this claim with empirical evidence that shows an inverse correlation between labor power
and investor protections and ownership diffusion, a common measure of stock market development. Roe,
Legal Origins, supra note [ ], at 497. But see Paul Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of
Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, [ ] (2003) (finding that the progressive lobby strongly
influenced the adoption of securities regulation by forty-seven of the forty-eight U.S. states between 1911
and 1931).
99
In the corporatist model of sectoral conflict, corporate insiders and workers may align to ensure that both
are entrenched. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 64-65 (“[S]olidarities are often based on
sectors, on ‘bosses and workers’ within a particular business sector who share interests, along with the
inside blockholders who join them.”). See also Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of
Corporate Governance, 95 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1005 (2005) (“show[ing] that entrepreneurs and
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The null hypothesis is that in any given year between 1980 and 1999, all countries that
had not yet enacted insider trading laws were equally likely to enact them and that chance
alone determined whether a country would move from the group of countries with no
insider trading laws to the group that had enacted such laws. The alternative hypothesis
is that this process was not random, but that because of country-specific conditions some
countries had a greater probability of enacting insider trading legislation than others in
any particular year between 1980 and 1999. More specifically, I have postulated that
finance, law and politics affect the likelihood that a country will move from “have not” to
“have” status with respect to insider trading legislation. Thus, I test both the proposition
that the time to adopting insider trading legislation, given that a country had no such
legislation in 1980, was non-random and that the time to adoption can be explained by
the factors identified in my hypotheses.
There are compelling reasons to think that enforcement rather than enactment is
the real turning point for a country’s stock market. Enforcement, because it requires an
expenditure of scarce resources, demonstrates political and legal will to give the insider
trading prohibition teeth. 100 In contrast, the enactment of insider trading legislation may
be relatively costless. Thus, I also examine the timing of enforcement. I take two
approaches. First, I examine the probability that a country enforced insider trading
legislation between 1980 and 1999. Under this approach, the question is: what
determined how soon after 1980 a country initially enforced insider trading legislation?

workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high
employment protection”).
100
See, e.g., Jackson & Roe, supra note [ ], at [ ] (comparing allocation of public and private resources for
enforcement of securities laws across countries). See generally Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in
Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 325, [ ] (2000) (discussing the need for complementary local
legal institutions to give “transplanted laws” teeth).
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Framed this way, the question implicitly assumes that the meaningful switch from “have
not” to “have not” status occurs not when a country enacts insider trading legislation but
when it enforces such legislation for the first time. Second, I examine the probability that
a country enforced insider trading legislation between the year of enactment and 1999.
The question here is: what determined how long it took a country to put its insider trading
legislation to work? In both cases, as for enactment, I simultaneously test whether the
time to enforcing insider trading legislation was non-random and whether it can be
explained by the factors identified in my hypotheses.
I examine these issues through duration or survival analysis. 101 This technique
seeks to identify for each point in time the probability that a nation will move to the
group of “have” countries rather than “survive” as a member of the “have not” group of
countries. In duration or survival analysis the hazard rate, h(t), is the probability or “risk”
that an event occurs at a particular time, t, given that it has not already occurred. As
explained above, I am interested in three hazard rates: (1) the probability or “risk” that a
country had passed insider trading legislation in year t, given that it had not yet passed
such legislation as of 1980; (2) the probability or “risk” that a country had enforced its
insider trading legislation for the first time in year t, given that it had not yet enforced
such legislation as of 1980; and (3) the probability or “risk” that a country had enforced
its insider trading legislation for the first time in year t, given that it had not yet enforced
such legislation since enacting it.

101

For a more thorough explanation of analytical methods for survival time data see WILLIAM GREENE,
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (1997); J. KALBFLEISCH,& R. PRENTICE, THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FAILURE
TIME DATA (1980); Nicholas Kiefer, Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 646
(1988).
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I test whether the three hazard rates are influenced by the hypothesized factors,
i.e., whether the probability or “risk” of the event in question (enactment or enforcement)
varies with country-level financial, legal and political factors. I use a Weibull
proportional hazards regression, which has the following form:

h[t , x (t ), b] = ho (t ) exp[x (t )' b]

(1)

where h(t) is the hazard rate at time t, b is a vector of maximum-likelihood regression
coefficients to be estimated by the model, x is a vector of independent or explanatory
variables, and ho(t) is the baseline hazard rate. The baseline hazard rate, ho(t), equals

ptp-1, where p is a parameter estimated from the data. 102 The model assumes that the
hazard rates are independent across countries, but not within countries over time. The
model is also dynamic in that it follows each country over time and therefore permits the
social context (e.g., financial development and politics) to vary over time.
The Weibull regression is convenient because it lends itself to intuitive
interpretation. In particular, a transformation of equation (1) yields the following
relationship:
ln(T ) = x' b + e

(2)

Equation (2) means that the log of the expected time (denoted as T) to the event of
interest is a linear function of the explanatory variables and an error term. In the
regressions I estimate, for example, T is the expected time in years from the base year
until a country’s enactment or initial enforcement of insider trading legislation. The
regression coefficients, b, signify the percentage change in the expected time to enact or
initially enforce insider trading legislation for a one-unit change in the corresponding
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explanatory variable. Thus, a positive b implies that an increase in the explanatory
variable increases the expected time to or “risk” of the enactment or initial enforcement
of insider trading legislation. Conversely, a negative b means that an increase in the
explanatory variable decreases the expected time to or “risk of” the enactment or initial
enforcement of insider trading legislation. 103
V. Data and Results
In this Part, I describe the data on which I test Hypotheses 1-3 (see Table 1 for a
summary of the hypotheses) and present the results.
A. Data Description
This section describes three sets of variables: the dependent variables, the
explanatory variables (to test the hypotheses), and the control variables (to hold other
relevant factors constant).
1. Dependent Variables
In the late 1990s, Professors Bhattacharya and Daouk sent a survey to the national
regulator and main stock exchange in each country with a stock market. 104 Their survey
posed two simple questions: (1) when did the country enact insider trading legislation and
(2) when did the country enforce such legislation for the first time? I use the information
they gathered from their survey to determine the timing of a country’s enactment and
enforcement of insider trading legislation.

102

See Kiefer, supra note [ ], at [ ].
For example, if the regression yields a negative coefficient on civil law origin when I estimate equation
(2) for the time to enacting insider trading legislation, the appropriate interpretation would be that on
average civil law countries are at a greater “risk” of enacting such laws, or enact earlier, than common law
countries. Conversely, if the regression yields a positive coefficient on civil law origin, the appropriate
interpretation would be that on average civil law countries are at a lesser “risk” of enforcing insider trading
laws, or enforce later.
104
Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ].
103

33
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008

33

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 81 [2008]

2. Explanatory Variables
Hypothesis 1. To measure stock market development, I use three variables: stock
market capitalization relative to gross domestic product (GDP), stock market turnover,
which is the total value of shares traded relative to stock market capitalization, and the
total value of stocks traded relative to GDP. The first variable, stock market
capitalization relative to GDP (in constant 2000 US$), gives an idea of the economic
significance of the stock market. The greater the ratio, the more significant is the stock
market to the economy. The second two variables measure the liquidity of, or extent of
trading in, the stock market. Stock market turnover measures the significance of the
value traded relative to the value of the stock market and the value of shares traded
relative to GDP (in constant 2000 US$), measures the significance of stock trading to the
overall economy. Annual values of these data are available at the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) database online. 105
Hypothesis 2. To classify a country’s legal system as a common law or civil law
system, I rely on two sources. The first source is the work of Professors La Porta et al. 106
They grouped countries into four legal categories: English common law, French civil law,
German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law. I code French, German and Scandinavian
civil law countries as belonging to the civil law family. The variable Civil equals 1 for
the latter countries and 0 for English common law countries. For the countries that La
Porta et al. did not report on, I fill in the gaps with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s

105

World Bank World Development Indicators, http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow “Data & Research” tab;
then select “World Dev’t indicators” from the scroll down menu under “Key Statistics”) (last visited Jan.
25, 2008).
106
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note [ ]; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note [ ].

34
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art81

34

Beny:

(CIA) classifications of national legal systems that are available in its publication, the
World Factbook. 107
Hypothesis 3a. For openness/competitiveness of the political process, I use three
variables. The first variable is the “fractionalization” of the legislature and comes from
the Database of Political Institutions assembled by Professors Beck et al. 108 This variable
measures the probability that two officers randomly chosen from the legislature are from
different political parties and ranges from 0 to 100%. A higher value signifies suggests a
more competitive legislature, i.e., that more political actors are “willing to act
independently in the consideration of any given policy change.” 109 Conversely, a lower
value suggests a less competitive legislature.110 The second variable, also from the
Database of Political Institutions, is a measure of political checks and balances. It is the
average of four alternative measures of political checks and balances and ranges between
1 and 10. 111 A higher value corresponds to more political checks and balances and a
lower value corresponds to fewer political checks and balances. The third variable, from
the Polity IV Database, 112 measures the general openness of political institutions. It

107

CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2008).
108
Thorsten Beck et al., New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political
Institutions [ ], 15 World Bank Econ. Rev. 165 (2001).
109
Id. at [ ].
110
Id. at [ ].
111
These measures, created by Professors Beck et al., take into consideration both the number of pivotal
decision makers (i.e., those “whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed”) and “the
effectiveness of electoral checks on government decision makers.” Id. at [ ]. The measures “count the
number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for whether these veto players are independent of
each other, as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their respective party
affiliations, and the electoral rules.” Id. at [ ].
112
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Polity IV Database,
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity (last visited January 21, 2008) (containing a “coded annual information
on regime and authority characteristics for all independent states (with greater than 500,000 total
population) in the global state system and covers the years 1800-2004”).
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ranges between 0 and 10, with 10 indicating the greatest degree of openness and 0 the
least.
Finally, using principal components analysis, 113 I combine the three political
process variables into a single variable, called Democracy. I use this combined variable
to investigate the political Hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3b. For political ideology, I again rely on the Database of Political
Institutions. The database includes information on the political orientation of the largest
party in the government. The dummy variable Left equals 1 if the largest party is
communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing, and 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable Center equals 1 if the largest party is centrist or its “position can best be
described as centrist (e.g., party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a socialliberal context),” and 0 otherwise. 114 Finally, the dummy variable Right equals 1 if the
largest party is conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing.
3. Control Variables
In addition to the explanatory variables that I use to investigate the hypotheses, I
include several variables in the regressions to control for latent social factors that may
influence policy outcomes.
First, I control for GDP per capita because wealthier countries tend to have
stronger government institutions, rule of law traditions, and regulatory resources than
poorer countries. 115

113

Principal components analysis combines several correlated variables into a single common factor. For a
more thorough explanation of the technique, see I. T. JOLLIFFE, PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS (2002).
114
A party is “[n]ot described as centrist if competing parties ‘average out’ to a centrist position (e.g., party
of ‘right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists’).” Beck et al., supra note [ ], at [ ].
115
See, e.g., Douglas North, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY [ ](1981); La Porta et al.,
Quality of Government, supra note [ ], at [ ].
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Second, I control for government quality. Professors La Porta et al. demonstrate
that “good” governments protect property rights and promote the rule of law and thus
facilitate orderly societies, markets, and economic prosperity.116 As a proxy for “good”
government, I use an index of corruption assembled by Professor Mauro. 117 The index
ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).
Third, I control for religious affiliation. For reasons that are not entirely
understood, empirical evidence suggests that Protestant countries have “better”
governments than Catholic and Muslim countries. 118 I create dummy variables for
Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, and Other Religion to describe the dominant religion in
each country. 119
Finally, anything that directs the public’s attention to the stock market and
increases concern that it is run fairly and efficiently may increase demand for insider
trading legislation. One such factor may be rapid growth in the economic significance of
the stock market and the resulting growth of the investing class. Rapid decline in the
stock market may have a similar effect. As they experience a decline in their financial

116

La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supra note [ ], at [ ].
Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q. J. ECON. 681, [ ] (1995). This control is justified by
cross-country empirical studies showing that there is a significant negative correlation between corruption
and the rule of law and financial openness. See Zvika Neeman, M. Daniele Paserman, Avi Simhon,
Corruption and Openness (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
118
La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supra note [ ], at [ ] show that religion is a good instrument for
the quality of institutions and government. Landes claims the reason is that Catholicism and Islam are
inherently (culturally) antithetical to institutional development. DAVID LANDES, THE WEALTH AND
POVERTY OF NATIONS [ ](1998). However, La Porta et al. argue that the real reason why religion matters is
not culture, but politics. La Porta et al., Quality of Government, supra note [ ], at [ ]. That is, xenophobia
and intolerance are used to fulfill the political, rather than the doctrinal/evangelical, aspirations of the ruling
class. See generally Djankov et al., supra note [ ] (modeling a society’s choice of institutions that have a
bearing on the country’s economic performance).
119
The dummy variable Protestant equals 1 if the dominant religion is Protestant, and 0 otherwise. The
dummy variable Catholic equals 1 if the dominant religion is Catholic, and 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable Muslim equals 1 if the dominant religion is Muslim, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Other
equals 1 if the dominant religion consists of religions besides Protestant, Catholic, and Muslims, and 0
otherwise.
117
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wealth, investors may demand greater legal protection, especially if they attribute the
decline to corporate fraud. 120 In short, other things constant, investor demand for insider
trading legislation and enforcement may increase on the heels of dramatic growth or
decline of the stock market. I control for this possibility using the five-year rate of
growth in stock market capitalization relative to GDP. I use the five-year growth rate
because any policy response is likely to follow with a time lag.
The data and their sources are described in Table 2.
B. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents the comparative experiences of stock markets until 1999. For
each of the one hundred and three countries reported, Table 3 presents the year in which

120

See generally, STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860 (2002) (parenthetical strongly encouraged). In some countries and periods,
the public may well be aware that insider trading occurs with some frequency, but that perception does not
generate opposition threatening either the market or the political status quo. However, a few high profile
insider trading scandals may spark public outrage that, at best, reduces public confidence in the stock
market and, at worst, threatens the political status quo. The government may respond by enacting securities
market reforms, including banning insider trading or ramping up the enforcement of existing laws, in order
to restore public confidence in the stock market or to avoid political backlash that could create even more
inefficiencies than insider trading may create. See Mark Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, [ ] (1998).
This phenomenon occurred in the United States in the 1930s after the stock market crash, which
precipitated the creation of federal securities regulations and an enforcement agency (the SEC). Similarly,
in the 1980s, during a period of hostile takeovers and highly publicized insider trading scandals (like the
Milken and Boesky cases), the U.S. Congress and the SEC responded to the perceived excesses with
heightened insider trading sanctions and enforcement. E.g., The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, §§ 3-5, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78u-1, 78ff(a), 78t-1 (2000)). More recently in the U.S., Enron, Tyco International, WorldCom and
other high profile corporate and accounting scandals have been responsible for the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(2000 & Supp. III 2004)). See also Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political
Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (arguing that most U.S. corporate crime legislation is
enacted in periods when there is great public outcry over corporate scandals and economic downturn);
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.
J. 1521 (2005). (a critique of the political process leading to SOX following “a free-falling market and
media frenzy over corporate scandals shortly before midterm congressional elections”); Bebchuk &
Neeman, supra note [ ], at 29 (predicting that investor protection will increase after “scandals or crashes
that make problems of insider opportunism more salient” and citing the 1933 and 1934 U.S. securities laws
and Sarbanes Oxley as consistent evidence). While it would be ideal to investigate the effect of scandals
directly, the data do not allow such a test. Controlling for stock market growth may indirectly address the
role of scandals to the extent that they become more salient in periods when such growth is dramatic.
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the country’s main stock exchange was established, the year (if any) in which the
country’s insider trading legislation was enacted, and the year (if any) in which such
legislation was initially enforced.
Table 3 illustrates the wide range of experiences across countries. For example,
the oldest stock exchange was established in Germany in 1585. The youngest stock
exchange was established in Kazakhstan in 1997. The earliest insider trading legislation
was passed in 1934 in the United States. Some countries, like Bulgaria, Swaziland and
Kuwait had not yet regulated insider trading as of 1999. The United States was also the
first country to enforce its insider trading laws while it took some countries three decades
longer to enforce (and sometimes to enact) insider trading legislation. For example,
Spain and Oman did not enforce their insider trading laws until 1998 and 1999,
respectively. The non-enforcing group as of 1999 included both developed markets such
as Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, and New Zealand and emerging markets such as
Mexico, Russia. Note that the average years of enactment and initial enforcement of
insider trading legislation are roughly similar between developed and emerging stock
markets. This means that emerging stock markets tend to enact and enforce insider
trading laws when their stock markets are relatively younger, and suggests that it is not a
history of experience with stock trading per se that leads to insider trading legislation.
While Table 3 presents data for all countries with a stock market as of 1999, the
descriptive statistics are calculated using fewer countries. To start with, they exclude the
nine countries that enacted insider trading legislation before 1980 121 and Yugoslavia,

121

Brazil, Canada, France, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States
enacted insider trading legislation before 1980. The United Kingdom is excluded from the duration
analysis below because it enacted insider trading legislation in 1980, the first year of the empirical analysis,
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leaving a total of ninety-three countries. Ideally, this would translate into 1860 countryyear observations per variable, i.e., one observation for each of the ninety-three countries
in each of the twenty years from 1980 to 1999. However, consistently measured data for
all of the countries and years are unavailable, so the results are based on fewer than 1860
country-observations. 122 Countries are also automatically dropped (or censored) from the
duration analysis for all the years after the year in which they enacted (or enforced)
insider trading legislation. Accordingly, I note the number of observations underlying the
duration regressions presented below.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the main variables. Table 5 reports
average correlations between the year in which insider trading legislation was enacted or
first enforced and the explanatory variables and is thus more interesting from the
perspective of the hypotheses. A negative coefficient suggests that an explanatory
variable is associated with earlier enactment or enforcement insider trading legislation,
and vice versa. The most striking feature of Table 5 is the high proportion of statistically
significant correlations spanning all variable categories (most are significant at the 1%
level). The timing of insider trading legislation and enforcement seem to be
systematically and statistically significantly related to the explanatory variables rather
than a mere coincidence.
The following relationships are statistically significant in Table 5. Wealthier
countries and countries with more developed stock markets tend to have enacted and
enforced insider trading legislation earlier, respectively, than poorer countries and

though it is included in calculation of the descriptive statistics presented in this section. Countries are also
dropped from the duration analysis for all the years after the year in which they enacted (or enforced) [ ? ].
122
This problem is not unique to this study. See, e.g., GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note [ ], at 24-25
(discussing “the small-n problem that bedevils [them] throughout [their] book”).
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countries with less developed stock markets. Common law countries tend to have passed
insider trading legislation earlier than civil law countries. Countries with more open
political systems and countries with left-leaning governments generally passed and
enforced insider trading laws earlier, respectively, than countries with less open political
systems and countries with right-leaning governments, consistent with Roe’s political
theory of finance. 123 Less corrupt countries tend to have enacted and enforced such laws
sooner than more corrupt countries. Finally, predominantly Protestant countries tend to
have enforced (not enacted) insider trading laws sooner than predominantly Catholic and
Muslim countries. 124 Aside from the finding that civil law countries on average enforced
insider trading legislation earlier than common law countries, the results in Table 5 are
largely consistent with the hypotheses presented in Part III.
C. Results of Duration Analysis
In this section, I investigate the hypotheses using duration analysis, as explained
in Part IV.
1. Enactment of Insider Trading Legislation
The measured duration (i.e., the time at “risk” of enacting legislation) for each
country is the period between 1980 and the year in which the country enacted insider
trading legislation. If a country had not enacted insider trading legislation between 1980
and 1999, it is considered to have been at “risk” for enactment during the entire period.
The results are presented in Table 6. The first four columns (1-4) show the
individual factors – finance, law and politics – that correspond, respectively, to
123

Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ].
Table 5 also suggests that countries that enact insider trading legislation earlier tend to enforce them
earlier as well. This is not surprising because laws cannot be enforced until they have been enacted, so a

124
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Hypotheses 1-3. Column 5 shows the full model with the control variables. Contrary to
Hypothesis 1, in column 1 the coefficient on stock market capitalization relative to GDP
is positive, suggesting that more developed stock markets took longer to enact insider
trading legislation. However, the coefficient is insignificant. Column 2 reports that the
coefficient on civil law legal origin is positive. This suggests that, as Hypothesis 2
predicts, civil law countries are were less apt than common law countries to enact insider
trading legislation between 1980 and 1999. Again, however, the coefficient is
insignificant. In column 3, the coefficient on the democracy index is negative and
significant at the 10% level. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, this means that strong
democracies were more likely to enact insider trading during the period than weak
democracies. In column 4, the ideology variables are insignificant, although the
coefficient on the right government dummy variable is negative, consistent with
Hypothesis 3b. In the full model, reported in column 5, the coefficient on the democracy
index remains negative and is significant at the 5% level.
In summary, the results in Table 6 suggest that political openness was the
dominant factor in countries’ adoption of insider trading legislation between 1980 and
1999. This finding is consistent with the prediction that outsiders have a comparative
advantage over corporate insiders in strong democracies with open political institutions.
Numerically, the regression in column 5 suggests that if a country had experienced a one
unit increase in its composite democracy index it would have experienced a 36% percent
decrease in its expected time to enact insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999,
other things constant.

positive correlation would be expected even if the time from enactment to the first enforcement were a
random process.
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2. Enforcement of Insider Trading Legislation
As explained above, I measure the duration until initial enforcement of insider
trading legislation in two ways. Under the first approach, the duration (i.e., the time at
“risk”) for each country is the time between 1980 and the year in which the country first
enforced its insider trading legislation. If a country had not enforced insider trading
legislation between 1980 and 1999, it is considered to have been at “risk” for
enforcement during the entire period.
Table 7 presents the results for the first approach in Panel A. In column 1, the
coefficient on stock market capitalization is negative and significant at the 5% level.
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and suggests that countries with more
significant stock markets were more likely to enforce insider trading legislation between
1980 and 1999 than countries with less significant stock markets. As for legal family, in
column 2, the coefficient on civil law origin is negative, which is inconsistent with the
legal family theory because it implies that civil law countries were more prone to enforce
insider trading legislation than common law countries between 1980 and 1999. However,
the coefficient on civil law is insignificant in column 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 3a,
column 3 suggests that strong democracies were more likely to enforce insider trading
laws during the period than weak democracies. The coefficient on the democracy index
is negative and significant at the 1% level. Column 4 shows that right-leaning
governments were more prone to enforce insider trading laws between 1980 and 1999
than left-leaning governments, consistent with Hypothesis 3b, but this result is only
marginally significant (p-value = 11%).
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The full model is shown in column 5. There, the coefficient on the democracy
index remains negative and significant at the 5% level. More specifically, the regression
in column 5 suggests that a country that had increased its democracy score by one point
would have experienced a 17% reduction of its expected time to enforce insider trading
legislation during the period, other things constant. In addition, the coefficient on the
right government dummy variable remains negative and becomes significant at the 1%
level. This result implies that, other things constant, a country whose government had
moved from left to right would have experienced a 22% decrease in its expected time to
enforce insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999. These results support the
political theory of finance. 125 Counterintuitively to the legal family school of thought,
the regression in column 5 suggests that civil law countries had a 25% lower expected
time to enforce insider trading legislation than common law countries during the period,
other things constant. Also, while financial development appears to have been
independently significant (see column 1), it is not robust like the political factors.
Finally, column 5 shows that wealthy countries, as measured by per capita GDP, were
more likely than poor countries to enforce insider trading legislation between 1980 and
1999. This result not surprising because enforcement involves a significant expenditure
of resources. 126
Under the second approach, the duration (i.e., the time at “risk”) for each country
is the time between the year in which the country enacted insider trading legislation and
the year in which the country first enforced such legislation. If a country had enacted but
not enforced insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999 it is considered to have
125

See, e.g., Roe, Legal Origins, supra note [ ].
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been at “risk” for enforcement over the entire period between the year when the country
enacted the law and 1999.
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 7. In column 1, the coefficient on
stock market capitalization is negative, as expected, but it is only marginally significant.
Column 2 shows that legal origin is insignificant. In column 3, the coefficient on the
democracy index is negative and significant at the 5% level. Consistent with Hypothesis
3a, this result suggests that strong democracies tended to enforce their insider trading
laws sooner after enacting such laws than weak democracies. In column 4, although the
coefficient on the right government variable is negative as predicted, the coefficients on
both ideology variables are insignificant.
Finally, column 5 reports the full model for the second measure of enforcement.
The coefficient on the democracy index remains negative but becomes insignificant,
while the coefficient on right ideology remains negative and becomes significant at the
5% level. Thus, the results in column 5 confirm the finding in Panel A that right-leaning
governments tend to have been more inclined to enforce insider trading legislation than
left-leaning governments between 1980 and 1999. The coefficient on civil law origin
remains negative and insignificant.
In summary, the enforcement results reinforce the preeminence of political
explanations over financial and legal explanations of insider trading regulation. 127

126

See generally Jackson & Roe, supra note [ ], at [ ] (parenthetical strongly encouraged). However, the
coefficient is relatively small.
127
Moreover, the enforcement regressions generally produce a better fit of the data than the enactment
regressions.
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D. Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of the results, I do several things. First, the analyses
above include members of the European Community (EC). These countries were
required, pursuant to the EC Insider Trading Directive of 1989, to enact minimum insider
trading legislation by June 1, 1992. 128 Thus, an important potential criticism of the
enactment regressions is that they include European countries with strong democracies
that did not necessarily choose to but were required to enact insider trading legislation.
However, I run the enactment regressions without the EC members and the results are
unchanged. In fact, when I exclude the EC members, the political explanations of
enactment (i.e., democracy and ideology) appear even more influential. 129 Second, I run
the same regressions using the liquidity measures of stock development (stock market
turnover and value traded relative to GDP) in place of stock market capitalization relative
to GDP. This does not change the results either. Third, I run the same sets of regressions
excluding countries whose stock markets were established after 1975, 1980 and 1990,
respectively, in case a different dynamic affected these relatively young stock markets
during the period in question. This does not change the results. I run country random
effects logit regressions for each of the duration measures on all of the explanatory and
control variables. The results are similar to those of the Weibull regressions.

128

89/592/EEC of November 13, 1989. See generally, EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING, supra note [ ]
(parenthetical encouraged); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Regulation, 15
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63 (2002) (discussing the EC Directive and differences in substantive provisions of
insider trading laws across countries); Amy E. Stutz, A New Look at the European Economic Community
Directive on Insider Trading, 23 Vand. J. Trasnat’l L. 135 (1990) (describing, in Parts III and IV, the EC
Directive and various EC members’ insider trading laws).
EC members were not required to enforce such legislation, however, so their inclusion in the enforcement
regressions should not affect those results.
129
When I exclude the EC members, the coefficient on the democracy index is -1.13 and significant at 1%
and the coefficient on right government is -0.79 and significant at 1%. Compare these results with the
corresponding results in column 5 of Table 6.
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VI. Conclusion
The article began with a stylized political economy model of insider trading that
encompasses both private and public interest theories of regulation. However, because
the underlying dynamics of this model are unobservable across countries, I then shifted
the analysis to a higher degree of generality to facilitate empirically testable hypotheses
about the comparative timing of enactment and enforcement of insider trading regulation
across countries.
The results are most consistent with Roe’s labor-versus-capital political theory of
finance and suggest that politics is the first-order determinant of comparative insider
trading policies. In particular, the results suggest that political openness and ideology
most aptly explain the comparative timing of insider trading regulation and enforcement
across countries. They show that more democratic political systems enacted and
enforced insider trading laws earlier than less democratic or authoritarian political
systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin, and measures of
latent social factors. The results also show that left-leaning governments were relative
latecomers to insider trading legislation and enforcement relative to right-leaning and
centrist governments, controlling for the same factors as above. In contrast to the
political theory of finance, the legal family theory of finance does not explain the
differential timing of insider trading regulation and enforcement across countries. In fact,
the results suggest that civil law countries may sometimes be more inclined than common
law countries to enforce insider trading regulations, contrary to the legal family theory of
finance.

47
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008

47

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 81 [2008]

This article’s findings have important implications for the longstanding debate
about insider trading regulation. While the private interest theory of insider trading
regulation posits that insider trading regulation is inefficient, this view is increasingly
challenged by the accumulating international evidence on the beneficial effects of insider
trading regulation by the state. The latter evidence suggests that stock markets become
more informationally efficient and liquid and the cost of capital falls after insider trading
laws have been enacted and/or enforced. The evidence presented in this paper
strengthens that challenge because it suggests that the kinds of governments that are more
prone to regulate insider trading are precisely the governments that are generally believed
to pursue market-promoting, not market-inhibiting, policies. 130 Market-oriented
democracies are more likely to have a polity willing and able to overcome entrenched
insider opposition to capital market development than authoritarian states. 131
The foregoing result, however, does not prove that right- and center-leaning
democracies adopt more efficient insider trading laws than left-leaning autocracies. This
article does not address cross-country variation in the substantive content of these laws,

130

See Donald Whittman, Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1395 (1989). See
also Mancur Olson, The New Institutional Economics: The Collective Choice Approach to Economic
Development, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN LESSDEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (C. Clague ed., 1997) (arguing that autocracies with short
time horizons have an incentive to confiscate their subjects’ assets and “[a]ny autocracy must sooner or
later have a short time horizon”); Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, On Democracy, Regime Duration, and
Economic Growth (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (2006) (showing empirically that over the
long-term non-autocracies produce greater economic growth than autocracies). See also Djankov et al.,
supra note [ ], at 612-612 (“voting is often a powerful force toward more efficient institutions”);
Acemoglu, supra note [ ] (suggesting that stronger democracies are more apt to produce efficient, or at least
less inefficient, policies than authoritarian states). But see Robert Barro, Democracy and Growth, 1
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (1996) (finding a non-linear relationship between democracy and
growth in which greater political freedom initially enhances growth but dampens growth once a moderate
level of political freedom has been attained).
131
While the article has not addressed the role of foreign investment and membership in multilateral
organizations in influencing a country’s insider trading policies, my hunch is that they are secondary to
domestic politics. At any rate, moreover, they are strongly correlated with countries’ internal political
conditions.

48
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art81

48

Beny:

but merely examines the determinants of the relative timing of a country’s switch from
“have not” to “have” status regarding the existence and enforcement of insider trading
laws. A more complete picture would emerge if it were possible to estimate the
relationship between financial development, legal origin and politics, respectively, and
the stringency of the substantive rules over time. 132 Such an analysis could reveal a more
complex (i.e., non-linear) relationship between the explanatory variables and insider
trading policy. It may reveal, for example, that the stringency of a country’s insider
trading law increases in its level of democracy. If overly restrictive insider trading laws
are inefficient, such a finding would suggest that stronger democracies tend to adopt
inefficient insider trading policies. 133 Alternatively, it may reveal that stronger
democracies adopt moderately stringent laws rather than excessively restrictive laws or
no laws at all. 134

132

Mahoney, supra note [ ], conducts such an analysis of state securities laws in the U.S. between 1911 and
1931. Specifically, in addition to examining the relationship between several explanatory variables and the
mere adoption of securities laws, he also examines the relationship between these variables and the
stringency of these laws. He finds that while ideology heavily influences the adoption of securities laws in
the first instance, private interests (in particular, small banks that competed with securities firms) had a
stronger influence than ideology on the type of law that was adopted. Elsewhere, I examine the relationship
between the substantive content of countries’ insider trading laws and financial development, though in a
static context. Beny, Do Laws Matter?, supra note [ ].
133
Acemoglu, however, suggests that countries in which the ruling elite are subject to greater checks and
balances, i.e., stronger democracies, are less likely to adopt inefficient policies than more authoritarian
countries. Acemoglu, supra note [ ], at [ ]. See also Whittman, supra note [ ], at 1397-1418 (arguing that
democracies produce more efficient policy outcomes than non-democracies and giving example of zoning
rules in the U.S.); Djankov et al., supra note [ ], at 612-613 (“voting is often a power force toward more
efficient institutions” and “[t]he substantial rise in the world’s prosperity in the 20th century may be the best
evidence of the virtues of democratic politics”).
134
Richard Epstein suggests that “the light touch version [i.e., moderate insider trading laws] is in line with
voluntary arrangements and thus imposes relatively little costs on firms and gives them this advantage. The
firm decision [to privately prohibit insider trading] is bonded and backed by the government. It is like the
food companies that love federal inspection within limits because it strengthens their claim for selling good
food. But once the laws become too strong, then they no longer replicate what the firms want and become a
drag.” Conversation between the author and Professor Epstein. For one example of “light touch”
regulation, see Adam C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, REG. 32 (2003) (arguing
that the government’s regulatory role ought to be limited “to ensuring that exchanges actually enforce their
[insider trading and anti-manipulation] rules as written and aiding in the enforcement of those rules”
because exchanges have better incentives than the government “to regulate in a way that optimizes the
trade-off between investor protection and the cost of regulation”). I am inclined to think that democracies
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There is, in other words, a genuine question of whether securities regulation takes
the form of a Laffer curve, under which both too little and too much regulation are
undesirable, from which it would then be possible to estimate the magnitude of the error
in both directions. 135 Unfortunately, the existing data do not permit such a refined
analysis. 136 Until they do, the evidence presented in this paper is, perhaps, the best
knowledge we have to date about the broad factors that are related to the timing of a
country’s initial adoption and enforcement of insider trading laws.

are more apt to adopt efficient insider trading policies than autocracies, for the reasons noted above. See
infra note 133.
135
This assumes, perhaps unrealistically, that we can determine the optimal degree insider trading and,
more generally, securities regulation for any given country at any given point in time.
136
While not impossible, such an analysis would require information on the substantive content of the
insider trading laws of over one hundred countries. The analysis, because it is dynamic, would also require
information on changes in the substantive content of each country's laws over twenty years. In turn, that
would raise translation and access problems, not to mention the difficulty of devising the proper coding
scheme.
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Figure 1: Model of Causality
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Figure 2: Cumulative Hazard for 1980 to Year of Enactment
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Figure 3: Cumulative Hazard for 1980 to Year of Initial Enforcement
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Figure 4: Cumulative Hazard for Year of Enactment to Year of Initial Enforcement
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Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Hypothesis1

Summary
A country with a more developed stock market is more likely to enact and enforce insider trading
legislation than a country with a less developed stock market.

Hypothesis 2

A common law country is more apt to enact and enforce insider trading legislation than a civil law
country with the same level of stock market development.

Hypothesis 3a

A country with a more democratic political system is more likely to enact and enforce insider
trading legislation than a country with a less democratic political system with the same level of
stock market development.

Hypothesis 3b

A country with a left-leaning government is more likely to enact and enforce insider trading
legislation than a country with a right-leaning government and the same level of stock market
development.
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Table 2: Description of Variables and Sources
Variable
Year main stock
exchange was
established

Description and Source
The year in which the country’s main stock exchange was established.

Year insider trading
law was enacted

The year in which the country passed insider trading legislation.

Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ].

Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ].
Year insider trading
law was initially
enforced

The year in which the country initially enforced its insider trading legislation.

Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per
capita

Annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant US$ (2000) for the years 1980-1997.

Stock market
capitalization
relative to GDP

Annual stock market capitalization (number of outstanding shares multiplied by their market value)
divided by GDP in constant US$ (2000) for the years 1980-1999.

Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note [ ], at [ ].

World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ]; United Nations Statistics,
http://unstats.un.org /unsd/default.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).

World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ].
Total value of
stocks traded
relative to GDP
Stock market
turnover

Annual total value traded divided by stock market capitalization in constant US$ (2000) for the years
1980-1997.
World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ].
Annual total value of shares traded on the stock exchange divided by GDP for the years 1980-1997.
World Bank World Development Indicators, supra note [ ].

Legal family

A dummy variable that signifies the country’s legal origin. The variable equals 1 if the country has a
civil law system and 0 if the country has a common law system.
CIA World Factbook, supra note [ ]; LLSV (1998).

Political openness
score

This variable measures the general openness of political institutions, measured annually over 1980-1999.
The variable ranges between 0 and 10, with 10 signifying the highest degree of political openness and 0
signifying the lowest degree of political openness. The 11-point scale is constructed additively.
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, supra note [ ].

Fractionalization of
the legislature

This variable measures the annual probability that two officers chosen at random from the legislature are
members of different parties. The index ranges between 0% and 100% and is assigned a missing value if
the country has no parliament. The variable was reported for the years 1980-1995.
Beck et al., supra note [ ].

Average political
checks and
balances

This variable equals the average value of four measures of political checks and balances, measured
annually over 1980-1995. The measures incorporate both the number of decision-makers “whose
agreement is necessary before policies can be changed” and “the effectiveness of electoral checks on
government decision makers.” The variable ranges between 1 and 10, with 10 signifying the most checks
and balances and 0 signifying the least checks and balances.
Beck et al., supra note [ ].
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Democracy index

Composite of preceding three political process variables, calculated using principal components analysis.

Ideology of the
largest government
party

Dummy variables for the ideology of the largest party in the government. The dummy variable Left
equals 1 if the largest party is communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing, and 0 otherwise. The
dummy variable Center equals 1 if the largest party is centrist or its “position can best be described as
centrist (e.g., party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a social-liberal context),” and 0
otherwise. A party is “[n]ot described as centrist if competing parties ‘average out’ to a centrist position
(e.g., party of ‘right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists’).” The dummy variable Right equals
1 if the largest party is conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing. Ideology was reported for the
years 1980-1995.
Beck et al., supra note [ ].

Corruption score

“The degree to which business transactions involve corruption or questionable payments.” The index
ranges between 0 and 10. 0 signifies the highest degree of corruption or side payments in business
dealings, while 10 indicates the lowest degree of corruption or side payments in business transactions.
The corruption index for a given country is the average value over the years 1980-1983.
Mauro, supra note [ ].

Religious affiliation

Dummy variables for the dominant religious affiliation of the country’s population. The dummy variable
Protestant equals 1 if the dominant religion is Protestant, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Catholic
equals 1 if the dominant religion is Catholic, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Muslim equals 1 if
the dominant religion is Muslim, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Other equals 1 if the dominant
religion consists of religions besides Protestant, Catholic, and Muslims, and 0 otherwise.
CIA World Factbook, supra note [ ]; LLSV (1998).
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Table 3: Comparative Experiences
The data in this table come from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).
Country

Year of Establishment of
Main Stock Exchange

Year Insider Trading Law
Enacted

Year of First Enforcement
of Insider Trading Law

Developed Stock Markets
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Hong Kong
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Developed Average

1859
1771
1801
1878
1919
1912
1826
1585
1891
1793
1806
1878
1929
1600s
1870
1819
1930
1831
1863
1938
1773
1792
1828

1991
1993
1990
1966
1991
1989
1967
1994
1991
1990
1991
1988
1991
1989
1988
1985
1973
1994
1971
1988
1980
1934
1990

1996
None
1994
1976
1996
1993
1975
1995
1994
None
1996
1990
None
1994
No
1990
1978
1998
1990
1995
1981
1961
1994

Emerging Stock Markets
Argentina
Armenia
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Bermuda
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Colombia

1854
1993
1987
1954
1987
1971
1979
1989
1890
1991
1893
1990
1928

1991
1993
1990
1995
1987
None
None
None
1976
None
1981
1993
1990

1995
None
None
1998
None
None
None
None
1978
None
1996
None
None
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Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Macedonia
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Namibia
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Palestine
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal

1976
1918
1996
1871
1969
1890
1992
1996
1989
1876
1986
1992
1864
1985
1875
1912
1966
1953
1961
1978
1997
1954
1984
1993
1920
1926
1996
1996
1973
1992
1988
1894
1994
1991
1929
1992
1960
1988
1947
1995
1990
1977
1951
1927
1817
1825

1990
1995
1999
1992
1993
1992
None
1996
1993
1988
1996
1988
1994
1989
1992
1991
None
1981
1993
None
1996
1989
None
None
1995
1996
1997
None
1973
1990
1988
1975
1995
1994
1993
None
1979
1989
1995
None
1996
1999
1991
1982
1991
1986

None
None
None
1993
None
None
None
None
None
1996
None
None
1995
None
1998
1996
None
1989
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
1996
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
1999
None
None
None
None
1994
None
1993
None
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Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Emerging Average

1882
1994
1984
1991
1924
1887
1956
1896
1990
1961
1998
1974
1981
1969
1866
1992
1867
1994
1840
1894
1994
1896
1933

1995
1996
1990
1992
1994
1989
1976
1987
None
1988
1994
1984
1981
1994
1981
None
1996
None
1998
1997
1993
None
1991

None
None
None
None
1998
None
1988
1996
None
1989
None
1993
None
None
1996
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
1995
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
The variables are described in Table 2
Variable

Number of
Observations

Mean

Std
Dev.

Min.

Max.

Age of Main Stock
Exchange

All countries

1929

1586

1998

Year Law Enacted

93 countries

1991

1980

1999

Year Law First Enforced

27 countries

1994

77
years
4.5
years
2.7
years

1989

1999

1737

$7,563

$9,506

$130

$53,420

1128
1037

0.4
0.4

0.5
0.5

<.01
<.01

5.7
5.3

1120

0.2

0.4

0

6.5

1023

0.5

0.3

0

0.9

1112
1167
900
All countries
798
798
798
1840
1840
1840
1840

2.8
6.3
6.9
71%
40%
10%
50%
10%
30%
20%
40%

1.4
4.0
2.4

1
0
1.5

9.5
10
10

Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita
Stock market capitalization
relative to GDP
Stock market turnover
Total value of stocks traded
relative to GDP
Fractionalization of the
legislature
Average political checks
and balances
Political openness score
Corruption score
Civil Law
Left
Center
Right
Protestant
Catholic
Muslim
Other Religions
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Table 5: Correlations
The variables are described in Table 2. The numbers in parentheses are
the probability levels (p-values) at which the null hypothesis of zero
correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests. The Superscripts a, b, c
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
Year Law Enacted
Year Law First Enforced
Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita
Stock market capitalization
relative to GDP
Total value of stocks traded
relative to GDP
Stock market turnover
Civil law
Composite Democracy index
Left
Center
Right
Corruption score
Protestant
Catholic
Muslim
Other Religions

Year Law Enacted
1.00
0.536a
(0.000)
-0.275a
(0.000)
-0.133a
(0.000)
-0.092a
(0.003)
-0.072b
(0.026)
0.188a
(0.000)
-0.189a
(0.000)
0.142a
(0.000)
-0.051
(0.163)
-0.113a
(0.002)
-0.174a
(0.000)
-0.024
(0.341)
0.033
(0.120)
0.039
(0.127)
-0.045c
(0.078)

Year Enforced
1.00
-0.386a
(0.000)
-0.175a
(0.000)
-0.284a
(0.000)
-0.317a
(0.000)
-0.161a
(0.000)
-0.046
(0.377)
0.145a
(0.005)
0.108b
(0.038)
-0.194a
(0.000)
-0.268a
(0.000)
-0.164a
(0.000)
0.221a
(0.000)
0.415a
(0.000)
-0.330a
(0.000)
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Table 6
Weibull Regressions of Expected Time to Enactment of Insider Trading Legislation
The regression is a Weibull hazard model, ln(T ) = x ' b + e where the dependent variable ln(T) is the log
of the expected time to enactment of insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999. Each explanatory
variable, described in Table 2, is measured in each year during the period that a country is at “risk,” except
the years for which the variable is missing. For Hypothesis 2, the omitted dummy variable is common law.
Thus, the coefficient on the civil law dummy variable measures the effect of having a civil law system on
the probability of enacting insider trading legislation relative to the effect of having a common law system.
For Hypothesis 3, the omitted dummy variable is left government. Thus, the coefficients on the right and
center dummy variables measure the effect of having a right or center government on the probability of
enacting insider trading legislation relative to the effect of having a left government. The regression
constant is not reported. The superscripts a and b, respectively, denote the 1% and 5% significance levels.
See Figure 2 for a graph of the cumulative hazard function.
Explanatory Variable

H1
Finance
(1)

H2
Law
(2)

H3a
Democ.
(3)

H3b
Ideology
(4)

72

92

63

56

538
0.02
0.89

1160
1.65
0.20

556
3.95
0.05

458
0.77
0.68

172
11.49
0.40

0.02
(0.14)

Civil Law

0.14
(0.11)
c

Democracy (combined variable)

-0.13
(0.64)

Center-dominated government

0.15
(0.24)
-0.05
(0.13)

Right-dominated government
Corruption index
Catholic
Muslim
Other religion
5-year growth of market capitalization/GDP
Number of countries
No. observations
LR
P-value of Chi2

(5)
6.20x10-6
(0.00)
-0.21
(0.24)
0.10
(0.31)
b
-0.36
(0.18)
0.16
(0.30)
-0.09
(0.17)
0.09
(0.08)
-0.09
(.022)
0.38
(0.35)
b
-0.51
(0.24)
0.01
(0.03)
23

GDP per capita
Market Capitalization/GDP

All
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Table 7: Panel A
Weibull Regressions of Expected Time to Enforcement of Insider Trading Legislation
The regression is a Weibull hazard model, ln(T ) = x ' b + e where the dependent variable ln(T) is the log
of the expected time to initial enforcement of insider trading legislation between 1980 and 1999. Each
explanatory variable, described in Table 2, is measured in each year during the period that a country is at
“risk,” except the years for which the variable is missing. For Hypothesis 2, the omitted dummy variable is
common law. Thus, the coefficient on the civil law dummy variable measures the effect of having a civil
law system on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to the effect of having
a common law system. For Hypothesis 3, the omitted dummy variable is left government. Thus, the
coefficients on the right and center dummy variables measure the effect of having a right or center
government on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to the effect of
having a left government. The regression constant is not reported. The superscripts a, b, and c,
respectively, denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. See Figure 3 for a graph of the cumulative
hazard function.
Explanatory Variable

H1
Finance
(1)

H2
Law
(2)

H3a
Democ.
(3)

H3b
Ideology
(4)

6.20x10-6
(5.38x10-6)
-0.11
(0.09)

b

-0.16
(0.08)

Civil Law

b

-0.06
(0.11)

-0.25
(0.12)
-0.17
(0.08)

a

Democracy (combined variable)

-0.21
(0.08)

Center-dominated government

0.00
(0.26)
-0.23†
(0.14)

91

93

70

61

-0.20
(0.14)
a
-0.22
(0.08)
0.00
(0.02)
0.02
(0.09)
1.83
(577.74)
b
-0.28
(0.12)
-0.01
(0.00)
29

981
3.21
0.07

1647
0.29
0.59

817
10.97
0.00

703
3.88
0.14

307
28.74
0.00

Right-dominated government
Corruption index
Catholic
Muslim
Other religion
5-year growth of market capitalization/GDP
Number of countries
No. observations
LR
P-value of Chi2

(5)
c

GDP per capita
Market Capitalization/GDP

All

† p-value = 11%
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Table 7: Panel B
Weibull Regressions of Expected Time to Enforcement of Insider Trading Legislation
The regression is a Weibull hazard model, ln(T ) = x ' b + e where the dependent variable ln(T) is the log
of the expected time to initial enforcement of insider trading legislation between the year of enactment and
1999. Each explanatory variable, described in Table 2, is measured in each year during the period that a
country is at “risk,” except the years for which the variable is missing. For Hypothesis 2, the omitted
dummy variable is common law. Thus, the coefficient on the civil law dummy variable measures the effect
of having a civil law system on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to
the effect of having a common law system. For Hypothesis 3, the omitted dummy variable is left
government. Thus, the coefficients on the right and center dummy variables measure the effect of having a
right or center government on the probability of initially enforcing insider trading legislation relative to the
effect of having a left government. The regression constant is not reported. The superscripts a, b, and c,
respectively, denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. See Figure 4 for a graph of the cumulative
hazard function.
Explanatory Variable

H1
Finance
(1)

H2
Law
(2)

H3a
Democ.
(3)

H3b
Ideology
(4)

-0.00
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.31)
-0.54
(0.41)
-0.19
(0.21)

-0.43
(0.29)

Civil Law

-0.53
(0.34)
b

Democracy (combined variable)

-0.53
(0.23)

Center-dominated government

0.01
(0.86)
-0.65
(0.46)

74

75

56

51

-0.33
(0.47)
b
-0.54
(0.28)
0.05
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.38)
6.30
(1317)
-0.37
(0.43)
-0.02
(0.04)
28

443
2.22
0.14

487
2.62
0.11

261
7.23
0.01

245
2.88
0.24

135
24.92
0.01

Right-dominated government
Corruption index
Catholic
Muslim
Other religion
5-year growth of market capitalization/GDP
Number of countries
No. observations
LR
P-value of Chi2

(5)
a

GDP per capita
Market Capitalization/GDP

All
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Appendix: A Model of Competition over Insider Trading Policy
This model of the market for insider trading regulation is based on Becker’s (1983) classic model of
interest group competition. As in Becker’s model, the model presented here incorporates both private
(distributional) and public (efficiency) considerations. There are three parties: “insiders”, “outsiders” and
the regulator. “Insiders” and “outsiders” compete for political influence over the regulator, who determines
the legal status of insider trading and the sanctions for violating the law, as well as enforcement policy.
The ensuing competition generates an equilibrium outcome in the “market” for insider trading regulation.
1) The Market for Insider Trading Regulation
a)

The Demand for Insider Trading Legislation

Any given insider trading regime tends to favor one party over the other. “Insiders” favor a lax
insider trading policy, while “outsiders” favor a strict insider trading policy. If the law is strengthened,
wealth is transferred from “insiders” to “outsiders”, and vice versa. Each group’s expenditures on political
influence (lobbying, information campaigns, monetary bribes, etc.) are a function of the amount of wealth
transferred to the group via the regulatory policy. Positive transfers generate support and negative transfers
generate opposition. At the political equilibrium, each group maximizes its income by spending an optimal
amount on political pressure, given the behavior of the competing group and the productivity of its own
expenditures.
The insider trading policy, denoted α, ranges from the most lax policy (i.e., minimal restrictions
and sanctions, and lax enforcement) to the strictest policy (i.e., maximal restrictions and sanctions, and
vigorous enforcement). The policy generates a level of “insider” and “outsider” rents, πI(α) and πO(α),
respectively, with the properties πI’(α) < 0, πI’’(α) > 0; πO’(α) > 0, πO’’(α) < 0; and
πI’(α) = - πO’(α). The policy, α, transfers the amount Ti to each group:

TO(α ) = ΠO(0) − ΠO(α )
TI (α ) = ΠI (0) − ΠI (α ),
where ∏i(0) is the total rent of group i when insider trading is not regulated, and ∏i(α) is the total rent of
group i under the insider trading policy α. Each group’s political support Si(α) is a function of the group’s
expenditures, Ei, which depend in turn on the regulatory transfer to the group, Ti(α):

Si (α ) = Si ( Ei ) = Si[ Ei (ri, ni, Ti (α )]

where ri = niei, ni equals the number of members in group i, ei equals the expenditures per member of group
i, and ni and ei are, for the time being, fixed.
b) The Supply of Insider Trading Legislation and Regulatory Equilibrium
The regulator chooses the policy, α*, that maximizes its total political support. That is, the
regulator solves the following maximization problem:

Max α [SI(α ) + SO(α )]
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= Max α [SI(Ei(α )) + SO(EO(α ))]
This yields the following first order condition:

∂EI ∂SI
∂EO ∂SO
⋅
=−
⋅
∂α ∂EI
∂α ∂EO
(a)
This first order condition implies that, at the regulatory equilibrium, the regulator maximizes its total
political support by implementing the policy, α*, that equates “insiders’” marginal opposition and
“outsiders’” marginal support. Graphically,

2) Comparative Statics
a)

The Effect of a Change in the Size of a Constituency

A change in the size of one the competing constituencies changes the productivity of its
expenditures on political influence. Recall the political support function

Si (α ) = Si ( Ei ) = Si[ Ei (ri, ni, Ti (α )]
Holding constant the amount transferred to each group, Ti, and expenditures per member, ei, the effect of an
increase in the number of members, ni, on the marginal product of political expenditures is given by
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⎛ ∂ ⎞⎛ ∂S (r , n) ⎞ ⎛ ∂ ⎞⎛ ∂S (r , n) ⎞⎛ ∂r ⎞ ⎛ ∂ ⎞⎛ ∂S (r , n) ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜
⎟ = ⎜ ⎟⎜
⎟⎜ ⎟ + ⎜ ⎟⎜
⎟
⎝ ∂n ⎠⎝ ∂r ⎠ ⎝ ∂r ⎠⎝ ∂r ⎠⎝ ∂n ⎠ ⎝ ∂n ⎠⎝ ∂r ⎠

= eSrr + Srn
The first component on the right hand side is the scale effect, which measures the change in the
productivity of expenditures as expenditures increase. More members, holding constant the level of
expenditures per member, means greater total expenditures on political pressure for any given policy. The
scale effect can be either positive or negative. It is positive if expenditures exhibit increasing returns to
scale, and negative if they exhibit decreasing returns to scale. The second component on the right hand
side is the free riding effect. The free riding effect is unambiguously negative due to free riding, which
arises because each member of the group has an incentive to do nothing and simply rely on the other
members to expend resources toward the production of political pressure.
The net effect of an increase in the size of an interest group is ambiguous. However, if the group
is sufficiently small, a modest increase in its size is likely to raise the marginal product of expenditures on
political support, since free riding is better managed in small groups and because economies of scale are
likely to be positive when expenditures are relatively low (Becker, 1983). Therefore, when a small group
experiences a modest increase in its members, the marginal benefit due to a larger scale is likely to exceed
the marginal cost due to more free riding, increasing the marginal productivity of expenditures. Eventually,
as the group continues to expand, the marginal productivity of expenditures falls since free riding becomes
unwieldy and diminishing returns to scale become more important (Becker, 1983).
More developed stock markets tend to have more numerous “outsider” constituencies. Thus, if the
scale effect outweighs the free riding effect, the productivity of “outsiders’” expenditures on political
support increase as a country’s stock market grows and becomes more liquid. A productivity enhancing
increase in the number of “outsiders” opposed to insider trading is represented graphically as follows:
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The marginal support curve shifts upward, resulting in a more restrictive equilibrium insider trading policy.

b) The Effect of a Change in the Productivity of Political Expenditures
An exogenous change in the “technology” of political support or opposition, i.e., a group’s ability
to translate its expenditures into political support or opposition changes the productivity of political
expenditures. A group may become “more efficient at producing pressure, perhaps because of greater
success at controlling free riding or at using television and other media.” (Becker, 1983, p. 379). In the
context of stock market regulations, for example, the emergence of investor advocacy groups may represent
a “technological” advance that increases the productivity of expenditures on lobbying for more stringent
insider trading rules and enforcement. These groups provide an important mechanism for the articulation
of the interests of dispersed shareholders. Similarly, institutional investors may help to overcome free
riding problems and thus increase the productivity of expenditures in support of stronger investor
protections.
A “technological” advance increasing the productivity of support for insider trading regulation
shifts the marginal support curve upward, implying greater support for regulatory intervention at any given
policy level and hence a stricter equilibrium insider trading policy.

3) Incorporating the Public Interest
Many economic models of regulation consider private interests as the sole determinants of
regulatory policy. However, Becker’s (1983) model of interest group competition reconciles the public and
private interest approaches. In Becker’s model, an interest group has an inherent disadvantage in the
competition for political influence if the policy that it favors is socially inefficient, i.e., if the social cost of
its favored policy is greater than its social benefit. Opponents of a socially inefficient policy have an
inherent advantage in challenging it. i
If insider trading legislation raises social efficiency, “outsiders” have an inherent advantage in
pushing for tougher insider trading laws and enforcement. This is represented graphically as a shift in
“outsiders’” support curve, resulting in a stricter equilibrium insider trading policy:
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Conversely, if insider trading legislation lowers social efficiency, “insiders” have an inherent
advantage in opposing tougher insider trading laws and enforcement. This is represented graphically as a
shift in “insiders’” opposition curve, resulting in a more lenient equilibrium insider trading policy:
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